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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
RIO ALGOM CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
JIMCO LTD. , HUMECA EXPLORATION 
COMPANY, JIM L. HUDSON, JUANITA 
J. MEYER AS EXECUTRIX OF THE 
ESTATE OF DANIEL H. MEYER, ELDON 
J. CARD, NORMA HUDSON, JEAN L. 
CARD, JUANITA J. MEYER, N. J. 
WHITE, AUDREY WHITE, WILMA WHITE, 
OTIS DIBLER, DOROTHY MAE DIBLER, 
GRACE DAVIS, and MARLOWE C. 
SMITH, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
* * * * * * * 
CASE NO. 16032 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
* * * * * * * 
Appellant ("Rio") hereby files its reply brief in response 
to the briefs filed by "Respondent Audrey Defendants" and "Jimco 
Defendant-Respondents". 
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT 
In Rio's opening brief and in the responsive briefs of both 
the Jimco and the Audrey Respondents, it is conceded that the 
following provisions of the Amended Audrey Lease governed the 
relationships between Rio-Audrey (as co-owner lessors) and Rio 
(as lessee) at all pertinent times until the court below approved 
the terms of the so-called "Settlement Agreement": 
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3.2 
21.3 
Irrespective of the provisions set forth in 
paragraph 3.1 above, Lessors shall have the 
election and option to have royalties due 
them under the terms of this Lease calculated 
and paid upon the basis of eight ~ercent (8%) 
of the fair market value at the m1ne portal 
of crude ore m1ned and produced from the 
Audrey Group ... [Emphasis added] 
Rio Algom Corporation shall, by reason of its 
interest in this Lease as described in Section 
II hereof, be excluded from ~ vote or 
decision of the Lessors relat1ng to royalties 
and requiring unanimity of the Lessors, as 
provided for in Section 3.2 hereof. The 
unanimous vote or decision of the remaining 
Lessors other than Rio Algom Corporation 
shall constitute unanimity for the purpose of 
the said Section 3.2. 
The parties, however, part company on the interpretation of 
this language. Rio claims that through paragraph 21.3, it excluded 
itself only from a "vote or decision" in exercising the "election 
and option" ... "as provided for in Section 3. 2". It did not 
waive or relinquish its contract right to the "election and 
option" or to participate in the resulting royalties whether the 
option were exercised or not. By withdrawing its prior election 
under paragraph 3.2 and by agreeing never to so elect again in 
the future, the Audreys effectively removed the election provision 
from the Amended Audrey Lease and diminished the amount of royalty 
that Rio could expect to receive as a Lessor thereunder, all 
without the consent of Rio as a co-lessor and co-tenant of the 
Audreys. 
-2-
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The Jimco and Audrey Respondents take the position, and con-
tinually restate it throughout their briefs, that through paragraph 
21.3 Rio not only excluded itself from participating in the "vote 
or decision" with regard to the making of the election or exercis-
ing the option, but also that it waived all contract and property 
rights with respect thereto. Hence, the Audreys and Jimcos could 
effectively remove the "election and option" language from the 
lease without violating Rio's contract or co-tenancy rights. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE INESCAPABLE EFFECT OF THE "SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT" IS 
TO CHANGE THE TERMS OF THE "AMENDED AUDREY LEASE" BY 
DELETING THE "ELECTION AND OPTION" PROVISIONS 
OF PARAGRAPH 3.2 
The factual setting which precipitated the litigation from 
which this appeal is taken is accurately stated at page 19 of the 
responding brief of the Audreys as follows: 
By the very nature of the contractual rela-
tionship which Rio, one of the world's great 
mining empires, entered into voluntarily, it 
was theoretically possible that if the fair 
market price of raw ore suddenly soared, and 
Rio had contractually bound itself to sell 
all of its concentrate for a fixed price 
which did not allow for such an incredible 
fair market value increase, it could find 
itself to have made a very bad bargain. This 
is indeed what happened in the uranium market. 
Fortunately for the Audrey Defendants, they 
had reserved the right to compute their 
royalty on either the actual sales price, or 
if this did not reflect market value, at the 
actual fair market value of crude ore, if 
they so chose. 
-3-
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The Audrey Defendants so chose, thereby 
causing financial pain to both Rio and the 
Jimco Defendants. 
Hence, it became apparent to the Audreys that, because of 
the long-term purchase contract, and the rapidly escalating 
market price, a peculiar set of circumstances had arisen wherein 
the actual fair market value of the underlying ore was greater 
than the long-term contract sales price received by Rio from 
Rio's purchaser. Thus, the Audreys determined that they could 
substantially increase their cash flow from the lease by exercis-
ing the option set forth in paragraph 3.2 which is quoted above. 
Pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 21.3, Rio could not, and 
did not, participate in that election. However, the availability 
of the election was a fundamental part of Rio's Amended Audrey 
Lease agreement and it was, and is, entitled to participate 
equally with the Audreys in the royalty payments pursuant to 
their underlying property interests as recognized and stated in 
the Amended Audrey Lease. The effect of this election, had it 
not been withdrawn, was: 
l. The Audrey-Rio share of royalties paid under the Amended 
Audrey Lease and the Rio-Jimco Option Agreement would have been 
increased and Rio would have participated to the extent of one-
fourth, or 25%, of that increase. 
2. The amount of such royalties to be paid to the Jimco 
Group would have decreased. 
When Jimco and Audrey reached impasse as to the mechanics of 
computing the royalty on the 3.2 election basis, Rio instituted 
-4-
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the action below as a declaratory judgment action in the nature 
of an interpleader seeking guidance from the court as to how its 
royalty payments should be divided under the provisions of the 
Amended Audrey Lease and the Rio-Jimco Option Agreement. 
Rather than face that determination, the Audreys and the 
Jimcos got together, without the participation of Rio, and agreed: 
1. Audrey would rescind the election which would have 
caused an increase in cash payments to itself and to Rio as 
lessors and would agree perspectively never to exercise that 
option in the future. 
2. In consideration therefor, Jimco agreed, rather than to 
face substantial diminution of its cash flow, and possibly its 
elimination entirely, to pay privately to Audrey a sum equal to 
2.5% of the proceeds received from the sale of yellowcake. 
Hence, through the so-called "Settlement Agreement" Rio's 
cash flow as lessor under the terms of the Amended Audrey lease 
was diminished and the cash flow to the Audreys was correspond-
ingly increased, all without Rio's participation or consent. 
Significantly, the Audreys and Jimcos did not offer to permit Rio 
to participate as a tenant in common in the 2.5% override. That 
was paid by the Jimcos solely to the Audreys to protect what 
otherwise was feared to be a severe, and possibly devastating, 
reduction in cash flow because of the election theretofore made 
by the Audreys. 
It would be hard to imagine a clearer case of unilateral and 
material changes in the Amended Audrey Lease. Such changes, 
-5-
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effected by the Jimcos and the Audreys through the "Settlement 
Agreement" without the consent of Rio, brings into play each of 
the doctrines and principles which are set forth in Rio's opening 
brief. It unquestioningly follows that the order here appealed 
from is in error and should be set aside. 
POINT II 
THE AUDREYS AND JIMCOS HAVE NO RIGHT TO CHANGE THE 
TERMS OF THE "AMENDED AUDREY LEASE" WITHOUT 
RIO'S PARTICIPATION 
As is shown above, the effect of the "Settlement Agreement", 
to which Rio is not a party, is to delete from the Amended Audrey 
Lease the election and option provisions of paragraph 3.2. 
Respondents' position, as stated in their briefs, is that by 
accepting the provisions of paragraph 21.3, Rio waived all rights 
under paragraph 3.2. Thus, Rio was not injured when the Jimcos 
and the Audreys joined forces to eliminate paragraph 3.2 from the 
agreement. Respondents argue that: (1) the Audreys, under para-
graph 21.3 could elect the yellowcake royalty provisions of 
paragraph 3.2, without voting participation by Rio, and (2) 
under that option, Rio, as a lessor-co-tenant, would receive the 
same amount of royalty as results under the terms of the "Settle-
ment Agreement"; Ergo, Rio has not been injured and the fact that 
Rio's co-tenants are given substantial additional royalty payments 
is of no legitimate concern to Rio. These arguments are falla-
cious. 
-6-
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The "election and option" set forth in paragraph 3.2 is not 
the exclusive right of the Audreys. Paragraph 3.2 provides that 
the "Lessors" shall "have the election and option". It is con-
ceded by all that Rio is one of the Lessors under the provisions 
of the Amended Audrey Lease. It follows that Rio has election 
and option rights. 
The fact that paragraph 21.3 excludes Rio as a lessor whose 
vote is necessary to exercise the option does not in any way rob 
or deprive Rio of its substantive rights set forth in paragraph 
3.2. Rio's rights with respect to the "election and option", 
which are vital parts of the Amended Audrey Lease, are analogous 
to the property interests of the owner of non-voting corporate 
stock. By acquiring "non-voting" stock, it became "excluded" 
from exercising voting rights, but retained its property interests 
in the stock. Likewise, here, Rio negotiated and signed the 
Amended Audrey Lease which contained valuable option rights 
conferred upon Rio and the Audreys as lessors. The "exclusion" 
of Rio's voting rights regarding the exercise of that option, as 
provided in paragraph 21.3, certainly did not strip Rio of its 
option rights as lessor, as specifically stated in paragraph 3.2. 
At page 19 of .the Audrey responsive brief, the Audreys 
stress the importance of paragraph 3.2 under the "incredible" 
market situation which has developed by stating: 
Fortunately for the Audrey Defendants, they 
had reserved the right to compute their 
royalty on either the actual sales price, or 
if this did not reflect market value, at the 
actual fair market value of crude ore, if 
they so chose. 
-7-
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In fact, they did so choose. Rio, as one of the lessors, 
then became entitled to have the "lessors" royalties computed on 
that basis. That right was forever abolished unilaterally by the 
Audreys when they contractually obligated themselves to the 
Jimcos never to exercise the paragraph 3.2 "election and option" 
in exchange for very substantial consideration not shared by Rio, 
their fellow co-tenant and lessor. 
This action on the part of the Audreys effectively destroyed 
the specifically stated "election and option" rights of the 
lessors. By so acting without the consent of all lessors, the 
Audreys clearly violated Rio's rights as a lessor under the terms 
of the Lease. Rio concurs with the suggestion at page 19 of the 
Audrey brief that the lessors were fortunate to have reserved to 
themselves the very important "election and option" rights. With 
inflationary and speculative pressures continuing to push metal 
values "through the roof", this right becomes more valuable with 
every passing year. The Audreys were not entitled to sell that 
valuable right without the consent of all lessors, including Rio. 
This is particularly true, as here, where the Audreys pocketed 
the entire purchase price for themselves. 
Thus, the election and option rights of paragraph 3.2 of the 
Amended Audrey Lease are rights belonging to all lessors, includ-
ing Rio and as set out in Rio's initial brief, the Audreys may 
not sell those rights without Rio's participation. To say other-
wise sanctions a breach of duties owed by the Audreys to Rio. 
-8-
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It should be noted that the "Settlement Agreement" through 
which this violation of Rio's rights as lessor was accomplished 
by the Audreys was conditioned specifically upon court approval 
and upon the substantive provisions of the order which is the 
subject of this appeal. Rio submits that this implementing order 
is erroneous for the numerous reasons set forth in its opening 
brief. It follows that said order should be reversed and set 
aside and this cause should be remanded for appropriate proceed-
ings before the court below. 
POINT III 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S SUMMARY APPROVAL OF THE 
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT WAS IMPROPER 
In their responding briefs, both the Jimcos and the Audreys 
cite numerous cases for the general proposition that the settle-
ment of litigation is favored by the courts and that settlement 
agreements should be enforced where possible. We assume this 
argument was made with tongue in cheek because: 
1. The Plaintiff below and the Appellant here, Rio, was 
not a party to the "Settlement Agreement", and 
2. A necessary element of the "Settlement Agreement" was 
to dismiss Rio's complaint against the Audreys (over Rio's objec-
tion), but to leave standing counterclaims asserted by the Jimcos 
against Rio. 
As set forth in Rio's opening brief, there are a plethora of 
fact issues involving the Settlement Agreement, its negotiation, 
-9-
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and its impact upon the various agreements at issue in this 
litigation. Rio submits that the existence of these fact ques-
tions would have made the "Settlement Agreement" here at issue an 
improper subject of summary approval and implementation by the 
trial court even if Rio had been a party to that settlement 
agreement, which certainly is not true in this case. This court 
recently treated this subject in Tracy-Collins Bank & Trust Co. 
v. Travelstead, 592 P.2d 605 (Utah 1979). In that case, where 
all parties to the litigation were parties to the settlement 
agreement, this Court cited and quoted with approval from Autera 
v. Robinson, 419 F.2d 1197 (D.C. cir. 1969) wherein that court 
stated that summary enforcement of settlement agreements should 
be made "only to the extent that full and fair opportunities to 
prove one's point are substantially preserved." 419 F.2d at 1203. 
Rio respectfully submits that under this doctrine, the order here 
appealed from is erroneous and should be set aside. 
CONLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, as well as those set out in 
Rio's initial brief, the "Settlement Agreement" between the 
Audrey and Jimco Defendants must be rejected and the approval by 
the trial court of that agreement reversed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ~t6 day of October, 1979. 
-10-
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of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
79 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
On this sr{ day of October, 1979, I hereby certify that I 
caused to be hand-delivered two true and accurate copies of the 
foregoing APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF, to: 
Fabian & Clendenin 
Attorneys for the AUDREY Defendants-Respondents 
800 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Clinton D. Vernon 
Attorney for the JIMCO Defendants-Respondents 
415 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
VanCott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy 
Attorneys for the JIMCO Defendants-Respondents 
141 East lst South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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